Articles Posted in Juvenile

The United States Supreme Court recently issued a new decision, Montgomery v. Louisiana, addressing the retroactivity of its decision in Miller v. Alabama. The Miller decision held that “a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the juvenile’s special circumstances.” The Court’s decision in Montgomery holds that the Miller decision “is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided.”

The facts of the Montgomery case are as follows: when Montgomery was seventeen years old, he killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana. Upon his conviction of murder, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. “Th[at] sentence was automatic upon the jury’s verdict, so Montgomery had no opportunity to present mitigation evidence to justify a less severe sentence.” After Montgomery had spent nearly half a century in custody, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller, holding that in light of children’s “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” the imposition of mandatory life without parole on juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Continue reading →

In a recent decision, Commonwealth v. Smith, the Supreme Judicial Court extended the “interested adult” rule applies to seventeen-year-old defendants. Under the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of rights, the police must provide a suspect with Miranda warnings prior to questioning the suspect if the suspect is (1) in custody – meaning a reasonable person in his or her shoes would not feel free to leave; and (2) the police know or should know that the questioning is likely to elicit an incriminating response. The police must warn the suspect that:

• s/he has the right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions;
• Anything s/he says may be used him/her in a court of law;
• s/he has the right to consult an attorney before speaking to the police and to have an attorney present during questioning; and
• If s/he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed before any questioning if s/he desires

If the suspect then chooses to waive these rights and make a statement to the police, that statement may be admissible against the suspect in the event s/he is charged and prosecuted. When it comes to juvenile suspects, however, the police must take an additional step before such a waiver is considered to be valid. Specifically, the SJC has stated that the “circumstances and techniques of custodial interrogation which pass constitutional muster when applied to a normal adult” may not be “constitutionally tolerable” when applied to a juvenile. Thus, while juveniles may make an effective waiver of their Miranda rights, “special caution” must be taken in determining the validity of the waiver. The SJC has recognized that there are unique problems that arise with respect to waiver when the suspect is a juvenile, and therefore Massachusetts has adopted an “interested adult” rule regarding confessions. Under this rule, the Commonwealth must show that a parent or interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain the rights to the juvenile so that s/he understands the significance of the waiver. Continue reading →

On December 24, 2014, in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District I, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that all life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders, whether mandatory or discretionary, violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. This decision went beyond current federal law, which holds that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment, but states that judges still have the discretion to impose such sentences following a hearing to determine whether life-without-parole is appropriate.

On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Judicial Court issued another decision, Diatchenko v. District for the Suffolk District II/Commonwealth v. Roberio, which addressed several questions “concerning how the opportunity for release on parole will be protected for juvenile homicide offenders” in Massachusetts. The decision specifically addresses three questions reported to the full SJC by the single justice regarding this issue. The SJC concluded that juvenile offenders convicted of homicide, sentenced to life, and seeking parole must have access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and expert witnesses if they are indigent, and an opportunity for judicial review of the parole board’s decision on their parole applications when they petition for release.

The Court explained that counsel must be provided to these juvenile offenders because “[a]n unrepresented … juvenile homicide offender will likely lack the skills and resources to [adequately] gather, analyze, and present” the “complex and multifaceted issues” involved in a parole hearing. The Court ordered that if an offender seeking parole is indigent, the public defender’s office – the Committee for Public Counsel Services – should provide representation.

In relation to the Court’s ruling that an indigent juvenile offender convicted of homicide must have access to funds to procure expert witnesses, the SJC explained that a psychologist or other expert may be crucial in explaining to the parole board the recent “scientific research on adolescent brain development [which] has revealed ‘myriad significant ways that this development impacts a juvenile’s personality and behavior,’ some of which suggest decreased moral culpability for certain juvenile homicide offenders or indicate a greater potential for them to mature to a point where they no longer engage in the behaviors that led to their crimes.” Continue reading →

Twenty years ago, a young man was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime – felony murder – that was committed when he was seventeen years old. At the time of the crime, the defendant and a friend got into a car with three other men. The five drove around Brockton before the defendant’s friend told the driver of the car to stop at a house so that he and the defendant could rip off drug dealers that they thought lived there. When the defendant and his friend got back to the car, the friend told the driver to drive to a nearby park. Without a word, the friend shot the driver and the other two men in the car.  One of the three survived by pretending to be dead and later identified the defendant’s friend as the shooter. The defendant told police he knew of the drug rip off, but did not know that his friend planned to shoot anyone and stated that the friend “just snapped.” The defendant and his friend were ultimately convicted of first-degree murder and both were sentenced to life in prison.

At the time of their conviction, Massachusetts judges were required to sentence defendants as young as fourteen to life in prison with no possibility of parole if they were convicted of first degree murder.  Given the state of the law, the defendant went to prison with no reasonable hope that he would ever get out.  Despite that fact, he signed up and participated in every educational and therapeutic program available to him.  He also found a way to avoid any trouble or disciplinary tickets, which are issued for any failure to follow prison rules and regulations, including such minor infractions as taking too long in the shower. Prison life is extremely difficult and often violent – so much so that it is almost impossible for young prisoners to avoid conflict and thereby receive at least some sort of disciplinary citation. the defendant, however, managed to do so.

This past December, Massachusetts became the first state in the country to declare life without the possibility of parole sentences unconstitutional for juveniles. Specifically, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama that it was unconstitutional to sentence defendants to life sentences without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles. The Court’s decisions was based largely on the growing scientific evidence that young brains are not as equipped as adult brains to control violent impulses and understand the consequences of rash behavior. The Miller decision led the Supreme Judicial Court to issue a similar ruling in December of 2013: Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District. The Diatchenko decision held that Massachusetts law imposing a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juveniles violated both the 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the analogous provision of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights set forth in Article 26. Continue reading →

This past Tuesday, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision in Commonwealth v. Watts. The decision held that the Raise the Age legislation, which raised the age of defendants who could be charged in adult court from seventeen to eighteen, is not retroactive, and therefore does not apply to cases that were pending at the time the law was enacted on September 18, 2013.

The Watts decision addressed two cases involving seventeen year old defendants that were charged prior to the enactment of the Raise the Age legislation, but whose cases were pending at the time the law was passed. After the passage of the law, both of the defendants moved to dismiss the charges against them on the ground that the District Court no longer had jurisdiction over them because they were seventeen years of age at the time the alleged offenses occurred and when the criminal proceedings began. The respective trial court judges denied the motions and both of the defendants filed for further appellate review.

In making its decision, the SJC noted that, under G. L. c. 4, § 6 and other applicable case law, a newly enacted statute is presumptively prospective – meaning that it only applies to charges brought after the enactment of the statute. There are only two exceptions to this rule – where solely prospective application would: (1) be inconsistent with the “manifest intent” of the legislature; or (2) be “repugnant to the context of the same statute.”

As to the first exception, the presumption of prospective application is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature if the legislature includes a clearly expressed intent for the statute to apply retroactively. The SJC found, however, that there was no such clearly expressed intent in the Raise the Age legislation. The Court pointed to the language of the legislation, which states both that “no criminal proceeding shall be begun against any person who prior to his eighteenth birthday commits an offense against the laws of the commonwealth . . . without first proceeding against him as a delinquent child,” and that the legislation “shall take effect upon its passage” (September 18, 2013).

The Court stated that, when the provisions were read together, the act provides that on and after the act’s passage on September 18, 2013, criminal proceedings may not be begun in the Superior Court or in the District Court against juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. Therefore, the act only protects juveniles who are seventeen years of age and who are charged with committing a crime on or after September 18, 2013, and juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of an alleged offense committed before September 18, 2013, but who had not been charged until on or after September 18, 2013.

The Court found that there was no language in the Raise the Age legislation that indicated that it should be applied retroactively to cases involving juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense and whose criminal cases in the Superior or District Court were pending on September 18, 2013. Continue reading →

On December 24, 2013, in Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that all life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders, whether mandatory or discretionary, violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. This decision went beyond current federal law, laid out in Miller v. Alabama, which holds that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment, but states that judges still have the discretion to impose such sentences following a hearing to determine whether life-without-parole is appropriate. Following the decision, the SJC issued a ruling in Commonwealth v. Brown, which lays out the sentencing scheme that should be applied to juveniles in light of Diatchenko.

Brown was charged with shooting and killing his friend on June 20, 2009. At the time of the shooting, Brown was just seventeen years old. On June 25, 2012, while Brown was still awaiting trial, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the decision in Miller. Brown was tried in August 2012 and convicted of murder in the first degree. Following the conviction, the sentence that the trial judge could impose was unclear. Under G. L. c. 265, § 2, all defendants over the age of fourteen who are convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. In light of the Miller decision, however, the trial court judge was not legally allowed to impose a mandatory sentence of life-without-parole on a juvenile. The Commonwealth filed a petition for review of the issue by the SJC. Brown’s sentencing was stayed until the SJC issued a decision.

In its review, the SJC first addressed whether Brown is entitled to the benefit of the law established under Miller and Diatchenko and concluded that the rulings laid out in the cases should be applied to Brown. The Court reasoned that new law must be applied to prosecutions that are not yet final at the time the new law is established, and that Brown’s conviction was not yet final because he had not been sentenced.

The Court then went on to discuss what sentence the trial court judge could impose in light of Miller and Diatchenko. Both the Commonwealth and Brown’s attorney made arguments to the trial court judge regarding this issue. The Commonwealth took the position that the court had the authority to sentence Brown to life in prison without the possibility of parole on a discretionary basis. Further, The Commonwealth argued that if the judge declined to impose a sentence of life without parole, the court still had the authority to impose a sentence of life, and set the minimum term that the defendant must serve before parole eligibility – for example, the court could determine that the defendant should serve at least thirty years before becoming eligible for parole. Brown’s attorney took the position that the court had the authority to sentence Brown to less than a life sentence, such as twenty years, because of the ruling in Miller.

Continue reading →

On December 24, 2013, in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the imposition of life without parole sentences on juveniles is unconstitutional. Diatchenko was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a man in 1981, when Diatchenko was just seventeen. At that time, all seventeen year olds accused of a crime were treated as adults, therefore Diatchenko was tried as an adult. Further, under G. L. c. 265, § 2, a first-degree murder conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Therefore, following the conviction, Diatchenko was sentenced to life without parole. Diatchenko subsequently appealed the conviction. The appeal included the claim that his sentence violated the 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, all of which prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. Diatchenko’s conviction was reviewed by the SJC and was ultimately affirmed, becoming final.

Thirty years later, however, on June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Miller v. Alabama. Miller held that mandatory life sentences for defendants who committed crimes when they were under the age of eighteen are illegal because they violate the 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In light of the Miller decision, Diatchenko filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of his sentence under G. L. c. 265, § 2, and seeking a declaration that Article 26 categorically bars the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for offenders who were under the age of eighteen when they committed first-degree murder.

In deciding Diatchenko’s petition, the SJC first addressed whether the rule set out in Miller is retroactive – i.e., whether the rule should apply to convictions that became final prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller. The SJC acknowledged that a new constitutional rule is not generally retroactive, but went on to state that there are two recognized exceptions to this rule. First, a new constitutional rule is retroactive if the rule is “substantive,” meaning that the rule prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of the defendants’ status, or the offense. Second, a new rule is retroactive if the rule implicates an issue of fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.

Bearing these exceptions in mind, the SJC concluded that rule set forth in Miller is substantive because it explicitly bars the imposition of a certain category of punishment – mandatory life without the possibility of parole – on a specific class of defendants – those under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was committed. Therefore, the SJC determined that the Miller rule should be applied retroactively to ensure that juvenile offenders “do not face a punishment that our criminal law cannot constitutionally impose on them.”

Continue reading →