Massachusetts Criminal Lawyer Blog

In Commonwealth v. Wright, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and ruled that the judge properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to Canadian authorities.

The basic facts were as follows. The defendant was a habitual abuser of drugs and alcohol. On the date of the killing, after imbibing Klonopin, marijuana, and beer, “the defendant began hearing a voice inside his head” telling him to kill his mother. In response, he slashed his mother’s throat. Later, he killed his grandmother in the same manner. He then drove to the Canadian border. He fled across the border into New Brunswick, but was quickly apprehended by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. “The defendant was then taken by … border officers to an interview room. The defendant was not handcuffed and appeared ‘fully oriented.’” One of the officers advised the defendant “of his right under the Vienna Convention to speak with a member of the United States government. The officer also informed the defendant of his right to speak with … an attorney paid for by Canada … and the defendant indicated he would like to speak with” an attorney. Nonetheless, he proceeded to converse with the officers without the presence of an attorney and disclosed that he had killed his mother and grandmother. “Custody of the defendant was transferred to United States authorities.” Prior to his trial, “the defendant moved to suppress his statements to the Canadian authorities on the grounds that they were involuntary and that he had not been given his Miranda warnings [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], but his motion was denied.” The defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.

In its decision, the SJC noted, “[W]e have previously held that Miranda does not govern interrogations ‘carried out by foreign officials in a foreign country,’” because “‘applying the Miranda rule to foreign police officers will not affect their conduct.’ Commonwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 96-97 (1969).” The Court opined that the defendant’s statements to the Canadian officers were “admissible if they were voluntary.” In the Court’s view, they “were indeed voluntary…. [T]here were no signs [that] the defendant was” impaired or that the officers had used trickery or coercion to elicit the defendant’s statements. In response to the defendant’s contention that the officers questioned him after he invoked his right to counsel, the Court stated, “This argument is unavailing, as the requirement that police halt questioning after an individual states he or she wishes to speak with an attorney stems from Miranda, … which does not apply here.” Continue reading →

In Commonwealth v. Jones, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction and ruled that the imposition of a mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole on a developmentally disabled person does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The background was as follows. The defendant killed the manager of the restaurant where he worked by stabbing and beating her. At trial, the defense was that the defendant was not criminally responsible. “The … consensus of all the experts who testified at the [numerous] competency hearings [in this case] … was that the defendant suffer[ed] from … ‘pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified,’” “a variation of autism.” There was evidence that “the defendant contracted spinal meningitis when he was six months old,” “which resulted in permanent, organic brain injury.” The defendant “demonstrated significant impairment in language processing and verbal communication…. He … had difficulty in interacting with people, was bullied as a child because of his lack of social skills and inability to communicate, and exhibited outbursts and uncontrollable behavior as a child.” Upon the return of the jury’s verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, the judge sentenced the defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant “argue[d] that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed on a developmentally disabled individual, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of” the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

In its decision, the SJC stated, “The defendant asks that we extend the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), that imposition of the death penalty on a person with an intellectual disability violates the United States Constitution, to imposition of a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on defendants with developmental disabilities.” The Court noted that “[i]n support of this argument, the defendant relies on [various other] cases from the United States Supreme Court,” including Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012), which held “that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit murder is unconstitutional…. We have extended the Court’s holding in Miller … in deciding that even the discretionary imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on juveniles is in violation of art. 26. See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 674 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).” However, stated the SJC, “[a]t this time, we decline to extend Atkins … and Miller …, either to eliminate sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for people with developmental disabilities or to require that such sentences be discretionary rather than mandatory.” In the Court’s view, the “concerns [expressed in Atkins regarding the special vulnerabilities of intellectually disabled persons] are less extreme … when an individual is facing a prison sentence, even when it is life without parole, than when an individual faces the death penalty.

In Commonwelth v. Orbin O., a juvenile, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision addressing a Juvenile Court judge’s authority to dismiss a case prior to arraignment. Unlike the decision recently issued in Newton N., however, the SJC ruled that the judge in this case did have the authority to dismiss the complaint prior to arraignment. The SJC specifically held that where a delinquency complaint is sought by a private party under G.L. c.218, §35A ((rather than by the police, as in Newton N.), and where the prosecutor does not affirmatively move for arraignment, “a judge considering [the] juvenile’s motion to dismiss prior to arraignment may consider whether the clerk-magistrate abused his or her discretion in issuing the complaint and, in doing so, may consider whether dismissal is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice.”

The background was as follows. “[T]he fourteen year old juvenile was in class at the charter school he attended. [He] became frustrated during a classroom interaction with the paraprofessional instructor assigned to the class, prompting the instructor to tell the juvenile to take a break, which was in keeping with the juvenile’s individualized education program (IEP)…. The juvenile swore at the instructor, and when the instructor told the juvenile he needed to go to the office, the juvenile replied, ‘Fight me.’ The instructor … stood in front of the classroom door while the juvenile remained in the classroom. When the juvenile ‘shouldered’ into the instructor in an attempt to leave the classroom, the instructor placed the juvenile in a ‘basket hold’ for approximately thirty seconds as a safety maneuver. As the juvenile struggled against the basket hold, he elbowed the instructor in the face.” “[T]he vice-principal of the … school filed an application under G.L. c.218, §35A, for a delinquency complaint, alleging that the juvenile [had] committed an assault and battery … against [the] instructor….  Following a show cause hearing, the clerk-magistrate issued a … complaint…. The juvenile then moved to dismiss the complaint before arraignment.” The Juvenile Court judge allowed the motion on the ground “that the instructor ‘caused the touching’ by physically blocking the juvenile from leaving the classroom when ‘[the juvenile] was trying to deescalate a situation using steps the [school] incorporated into his [IEP].’ The judge concluded that, under these circumstances, there was not probable cause to believe that the juvenile acted intentionally or recklessly…. The Commonwealth appealed.” Continue reading →

The Supreme Judicial Court recently issued a decision in Commonwealth v. Newton N., a juvenile addressing a judge’s authority to dismiss a delinquency complaint against a juvenile prior to arraignment. In its decision, the SJC vacated the dismissal of the delinquency complaint against the juvenile defendant, holding that the Juvenile Court judge did not have the authority to dismiss the “complaint before arraignment where the complaint was supported by probable cause and where the prosecutor wished to proceed to arraignment.”

The background was as follows. “[P]olice officers were dispatched to [an] apartment complex … in response to a report that a young boy … was making noise and carrying a gun.” When officers approached the boy, who was twelve years old, he “‘loudly curs[ed]’ at them…. The boy sounded ‘deranged[,] making no sense at times.’” The police escorted the boy to his home, where he “declared himself to be ‘Satan’ and said ‘we have weapons’ and ‘we are going to kill everyone.’” The police called for an ambulance so that the juvenile could be transported to a hospital for a mental evaluation. “As the juvenile waited for the ambulance, he … hit himself on the head with closed fists.” In the ambulance, “he began punching himself in the genitals with his closed fists and had to be placed in restraints. The ambulance report indicated that the juvenile had an autism diagnosis and that he had not received his morning medication.” On the basis of the juvenile’s actions that precipitated the initial report to the police, an “officer applied for and obtained a delinquency complaint from a clerk-magistrate, charging the juvenile with [several offenses, including] disorderly conduct…. The Commonwealth moved for arraignment and the juvenile moved pre-arraignment to dismiss the … complaint. The Juvenile Court judge … allowed the juvenile’s motion…. The judge noted that each of the alleged offenses included an element of specific intent. [She] concluded … that there was not sufficient evidence as to the element of intent or the element of recklessness (for the charge of disorderly conduct) to support a finding of probable cause. [She] determined, based on the juvenile’s statements and actions, that the juvenile ‘was acting in a diminished, if not psychotic state, and therefore could not have possessed the requisite mental state.’…. The judge further reasoned that the juvenile’s age … was a ‘relevant’ consideration in determining probable cause…. [She] added: ‘It is not only in the best interest of [the juvenile] but in the interest of justice to dismiss these four charges prior to arraignment. [The juvenile] is a child in need of aid.’” The Commonwealth appealed from the dismissal. Continue reading →