Massachusetts Criminal Lawyer Blog

In Josh J., a juvenile v. Commonwealth, the SJC ruled “that where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to G.L. c.276, §58, and there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either §58 or §58B.”

The background was as follows. “On May 6, 2016, a delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with [two offenses]. A judge in the Juvenile Court set the juvenile’s bail at $1,000…. The juvenile posted bail and was released. In August, 2016, two delinquency complaints issued against the juvenile for several new crimes he allegedly committed while on release on the pending charges….  In November, 2016, based on the new charges, the Commonwealth sought to revoke the juvenile’s bail pursuant to G.L. c.276, §58. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion, revoked the juvenile’s bail, and set a date for a bail review hearing on January 30, 2017, which amounted to a ninety-day bail revocation. By January 10, 2017, the charges stemming from the juvenile’s conduct while he was released on bail had been resolved. The juvenile continued to be held on the original charges, however, so he moved to vacate the bail revocation order, but the judge who had revoked bail denied that motion. In response, the juvenile filed an emergency petition … pursuant to G.L. c.211, §3.” He “claim[ed] that the judge erred in applying the ninety-day revocation period under … c.276, §58B, as opposed to the sixty-day revocation period under … c.276, §58, after finding probable cause to believe that the juvenile had committed a crime while released on bail under §58. The crux of the juvenile’s argument is that because bail can be revoked under either §58 or §58B, where an individual commits a crime while on release, the statutes create an ambiguous bail revocation framework, and therefore, the rule of lenity requires the application of the sixty-day revocation period under §58.” The single justice reserved and reported the juvenile’s petition to the full SJC. Continue reading →

In Commonwealth v. McGonagle, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed two questions relating to judicial consideration of victim impact statements. In the decision, the Court affirmed the judge’s sentencing decision holding (1) that the “judge’s consideration of victim impact statements ‘as to a recommended sentence’ [under G.L. c.258B, §3(p)] [was] constitutional;” and (2) “that a victim’s right to recommend a sentence pursuant to [the statute] satisfies the requirements of due process.”

The background was as follows. “[A] jury convicted the defendant … of assault and battery…. At the … sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth requested that the defendant be sentenced to two and one-half years in a house of correction, the maximum possible sentence under the statute, to be served from and after his release on an unrelated one-year sentence…. Immediately after the Commonwealth’s recommendation, the victim gave an impact statement, during which he told the judge, ‘I would like … for [the defendant] to get the maximum [sentence], and not concurrent.’ The defendant then requested a sentence of nine months … to be served concurrently with his unrelated sentence. The judge sentenced the defendant to eighteen months in a house of correction to be served concurrently with the sentence he was then serving. This was a lesser term of imprisonment than the maximum possible sentence or the sentences recommended by both the Commonwealth and the victim. The judge did not explicitly reference the victim’s statement, but explained that in deciding the appropriate sentence, he placed great weight on the victim’s injuries and the defendant’s criminal record.” On appeal, the defendant “challenge[d] the portion of [G.L. c.258B, §3(p)] that permits victims to provide an impact statement ‘as to a recommended sentence.’ The defendant relie[d] on Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); … and Bosse [v. Oklahoma], 137 S.Ct. 1 [2016] [per curiam] to support his claim that a victim’s recommendation as to a particular sentence violates the proscription against cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth Amendment, and its ‘cruel or unusual punishments’ counterpart under art. 26 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights]. The defendant further contend[ed] that allowing a victim to recommend a particular sentence violates due process.” Continue reading →

In Commonwealth v. Cole C., the SJC weighed in jurisdictional issues relating to the Juvenile Court. Specifically, in its decision, the SJC reversed the Juvenile Court judge’s dismissal of youthful offender indictments against the defendant.

The background was as follows. “On April 20, 2016, Boston police arrested the defendant on a variety of charges related to an armed home invasion that occurred that day. He was seventeen years old at that time. After his arrest, the police took him to a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility” and a multicount delinquency complaint was issued. “The defendant was arraigned on April 25, 2016, and two days after that (one week after the alleged incident), he turned eighteen. On July 5, 2016, a grand jury indicted the defendant as a youthful offender on five charges, [including] armed home invasion.” On the date set for arraignment, however, the Juvenile Court judge “refused to arraign the defendant on the youthful offender indictments on the grounds that — because the defendant had turned eighteen prior to the issuance of the indictments — the court lacked jurisdiction over them.” The defendant then moved to dismiss the indictments, the judge allowed the motion, and the Commonwealth appealed. Continue reading →

In Commonwealth v. Lastowski, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas due to the purported ineffectiveness of his attorney. The specifically SJC ruled that the defendant had failed to satisfy the prejudice requirement of the test for ineffectiveness under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974).

The background was as follows. “In 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older.” At the plea hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence that each of the three victims reported to the police that the defendant had inappropriately touched her breast and that “[o]ne of the victims also reported that ‘on one occasion [the defendant] had grabbed her groin area.’” The judge accepted the defendant’s pleas without “inform[ing] [him] of the possible consequences of registration as a sex offender.” The judge “adopted the defendant’s recommendations” as to sentencing and “placed [him] on probation for one year” with conditions. “One year later, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, contending that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective because [he] failed to advise [the defendant] of the duty to register as a sex offender, and its consequences, or explain that [the defendant] might have sought a continuance without a finding.” “[T]he motion judge, who … had also been the plea judge, denied the defendant’s motion.” Continue reading →

In Commonwealth v. Woollam, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the unauthorized presence of police officers during the grand jury proceedings did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice and affirmed the defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and a related offense.

The background was as follows. The victim was shot to death in the apartment out of which he “ran a large-scale drug operation.” At the time of his death, he had two ‘employees,’ [including] the defendant, who delivered marijuana to customers and collected the money.” The defendant was arrested in connection with the killing. “During the Commonwealth’s presentation to the grand jury in support of indictments against the defendant, one or both of two police officers involved in the investigation were present in the grand jury room for most, if not all, of the witnesses’ testimony. [In his appeal,] [t]he defendant contend[ed] that the error, conceded by the Commonwealth, require[d] not only the vacatur of his convictions but also the dismissal of the indictments under the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.” Continue reading →

The Supreme Judicial Court recently affirmed the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder in Commonwealth v. Facella, ruling that the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting evidence during the Commonwealth’s rebuttal regarding misconduct by the defendant that predated the killing by many years.

The background was as follows. The defendant beat his girl friend to death in 2002. At the trial, the defendant raised a lack of criminal responsibility, claiming that, “at the time of the killing, he had been taking interferon to treat a hepatitis C infection” and that the drug had “rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.” The defendant’s medical experts testified that interferon can cause irritability, aggression, and impulsivity. Members of the defendant’s family testified that he began to display these characteristics after he began taking interferon in the fall of 2001. “[T]here also was evidence in the form of medical records indicating [that] the defendant had been treated with interferon for six months beginning around 1994 or 1995.” “To rebut [the interferon] defense, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant, before ever taking the drug, had beaten and threatened to kill two other women with whom he was romantically involved between 1978 and 1989.” On appeal, the defendant argued that the admission of the rebuttal evidence was erroneous, on the ground that there was an insufficient “temporal and substantive nexus between [that] evidence and the charged crime.” Continue reading →