Massachusetts Criminal Lawyer Blog

In an upcoming case, Commonwealth v. Laltaprasad, the Supreme Judicial Court will hear oral argument on the question of whether a trial court judge has discretion to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimums prescribed by G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32(b) and 32A(d), pursuant to G. L. c. 211E, § 3(e).  G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32(b) and 32A(d) each set forth a three and a half-year mandatory minimum sentence for second and subsequent offenses of distributing or possessing with intent to distribute class A and class B drugs. G. L. c. 211E, § 3(e) states that except for murder, a “sentencing judge may . . . impose a sentence below any mandatory minimum term prescribed by statute . . . based on a finding that there exists one or more mitigating circumstances that should result in a sentence . . . below any applicable mandatory minimum term.”

In Mr. Laltaprasad’s case, the trial court judge found such mitigating circumstances – the judge specifically noted the small quantity of drugs involved and Mr. Laltaprasad’s serious medical condition – and found that these circumstances justified a departure below the mandatory minimums. The judge then imposed a sentence of 2 ½ years to the house of correction, citing to G. L. c. 211E, § 3(e) as her authority to do so. The Commonwealth filed a petition for the Supreme Judicial Court to review the trial court judge’s decision and challenging the legality of the sentence.

In his response to the Commonwealth’s petition, Laltaprasad’s attorneys argue that the plain language of G. L. c. 211E, § 3(e) clearly gives judges authority to impose a below-minimum sentence. Alternatively, Laltaprasad argues that even if the statute is deemed to be ambiguous, consideration of the legislative intent and application of both the rule of lenity (interpreting an ambiguous criminal statute in favor of the defendant) and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance (construing a statute to avoid constitutional problems arising from an alternative construction) should lead to that same interpretation.

The Middlesex District Attorney’s office argues that pursuant to G.L. c. 211E, § 3(a)(1), as interpreted by the SJC in a case decided twenty-two years ago, the authority to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum does not go into effect until the Legislature enacts into law the sentencing guidelines recommended by the Sentencing Commission. Because those guidelines have not been enacted, the Middlesex DA argues, judges still lack authority to impose a below-mandatory minimum sentence.      Continue reading →

In a recent decision, Charbonneau v. Presiding Justice of the Holyoke Division of the District Court Department, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated “a standing order of the Holyoke Division of the District Court Department … prohibiting the tender of a so-called ‘defendant-capped’ plea on the day of trial.” The SJC reasoned that the standing order “contravene[d] the guilty plea procedure mandated in G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12.”

Under G. L. c. 278, § 18 and Rule 12, a defendant facing charges in the District Court has the right a “defendant capped” plea. This means that a defendant in the District Court has the right to withdraw any plea in which the judge exceeds the defendant’s recommended sentence. This is in contrast to Superior Court, where a Commonwealth capped plea is procedure is in effect – a Commonwealth capped plea procedure allows a defendant to withdraw any plea in which the judge exceeds the Commonwealth’s recommended sentence. The standing order at question in the case, which was issued by the presiding justice of the Holyoke District Court, directed that as of June 2015, “a defendant who intended to proffer a defendant-capped plea was required to do so” no later than 2:00 p.m. on the day prior to the scheduled trial. “The standing order further provide[d] that ‘[t]he [c]ourt will continue to accept unagreed pleas on the day of trial[.  H]owever, the pleas will be Commonwealth-capped pleas on the day of trial and the defendant will not be allowed to withdraw a plea which exceeds his suggested sentence unless the [c]ourt’s disposition exceeds the Commonwealth’s recommendation.’” In other words, the standing order allowed for a defendant capped plea up until 2:00p.m. prior to the date of trial, however, if the defendant chose to tender a plea on the actual trial date, s/he would be subject to a Commonwealth capped plea, and would not be able to withdraw his or her plea if it took place on the trial date unless the judge exceeded the Commonwealth’s recommended sentence. The presiding justice explained that the standing order “was proposed as a means to maximize ‘juror utilization.’” Continue reading →